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The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) requires depository institutions to help 
meet the credit needs of their communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, 
consistent with safe and sound lending practices.  Despite the clear focus of CRA and other fair 
credit and housing legislation on individual lender responsibilities, consumer finance studies 
generally do not concede any differences in the mortgage lending activities of individual lenders; 
they consider variance among either individuals or neighborhoods. Virtually all of the studies 
draw inferences about the practices of some prototypical lender from data pooled across many 
lenders. Our strategy is to examine differences among individual lenders in the rates at which 
they receive applications fiom, and originate mortgage loans to, minority and low-income 
applicants. More specifically, we use the new applicant-level data gathered under the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 -A)  to examine differences in minority and low-income 
mortgage loan originations across the more than 8,600 U.S. lenders who received applications for 
single-family home purchase loans in  1990. We then allocate the variance in lender-specific credit 
originations into two components: differences among lenders in their application volumes from 
various population groups, and differences among lenders in the actions taken on applications 
they receive.  Both the applications and their disposition are then examined firther for lender 
differences. 
Although our analysis reveals substantial differences in regard to lenders' housing market 
activities, we do not attempt to draw conclusions regarding discrimination. We emphasize that 
the HMDA data do not contain enough relevant information about the loan applicants to draw 
any firm conclusions regarding the reasons for observed variance in denial rates.  Instead, we take 
up  the broader issue of whether the substantial differences we observe in lenders' credit flows to 
minority and low-income households stem findamentally from differences in the volume of these 
applications received by  lenders, or from differential actions taken on the applications. We 
conclude that for the United States as a whole, the variance across lenders in minority or low- 
income loan originations, relative to total originations, is overwhelmingly accounted for by  the 
variance in application rates to those lenders, as opposed to relative differences in the disposition 
of the applications after they are received.  We also find that only a small portion of these 
differences result fiom application characteristics that may reflect the type of loan being applied 
for (loan size, FHANA or conventional loan, etc.). In addition, they cannot be accounted for 
solely by  geographic differences in  markets served by  lenders: Lenders that receive a relatively 
large proportion of minority applications tend to draw applicants from many neighborhoods 
within their MSA,  not just  from a small number of predominantly minority census tracts; lenders 
that receive a relatively small proportion of minority applications fail to attract as many of the 
minority residents looking for homes in the neighborhoods they serve. 
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During the 1970s, amid concern about the adequacy of housing credit flows to minority 
and low-income neighborhoods, Congress passed a pair of laws designed to encourage more 
lending by depository financial institutions (essentially banks and thrifts). Through the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act of  1V5  (HMDA), these fm  became obligated to collect and publicly 
report by census tract the total number of mortgage loans they originate.  The Community 
Reinvestment Act of  1977 (CRA) requires depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of 
their communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and 
sound lending practices.  Amendments to HMDA in 1989 now require most depository 
institutions (and certain other mortgage lenders) to collect and report information on all individual 
loan applications taken, whether approved or not.  Regulators are charged with collecting and 
using these data to monitor lenders for compliance with CRA and other lending statutes. 
This information garners an unusual amount of attention from the news media.  It is not 
uncommon to find newspaper articles, based on HMDA data, that describe the volume of 
mortgages flowing into different neighborhoods in a metropolitan area, with inferences drawn 
about the policies of the prototypical lender.'  When the 1990 HMDA data were released, 
enabling for the first time a calculation of application denial rates by race and income, news 
accounts zeroed in on this aspect of the data.  Even the Federal Reserve Board (Canner and Smith 
[  1991]), when providing the first glimpse of the 1990-vintage  HMDA data, included a discussion 
of the rates at which different racial and income groups were denied housing credit by all 
reporting lenders taken as a group. 
Our strategy is to examine differences among individual lenders in the rates at which they 
receive applications from, and originate mortgage loans to, minority and low-income applicants. 
More specifically, we use the new applicant-level HMDA data to examine differences in minority 
and low-income mortgage loan originations across the more than 8,600 lenders throughout the 
United States who received applications for single-family home purchase loans in 1990. We then 
allocate the variance in lender-specific credit originations into two components: differences  in 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmapplication volumes from various population groups, and differences in response to actions taken 
on the applications.  Both the applications and their disposition are then examined further for 
lender differences. 
Despite the clear focus of CRA  and other fair credit and housing legislation on individual 
lender responsibilities, consumer finance studies generally do not concede any differences in the 
mortgage lending activities of individual lenders; they consider variance among either people2 or 
neighborhoods.3 We believe the individual lender vantage point actually can provide important 
insights into the mortgage credit process.  First, with regard to compliance, the lender -- rather 
than the applicant or neighborhood -- is clearly the appropriate unit of analysis.  We would like to 
understand how and why individual lenders differ in their servicing of specific markets.  Second, 
just as previous research reveals that applicants and geographic areas are heterogeneous with 
respect to the demographic and financial characteristics that affect mortgage lending decisions, we 
regard lenders as heterogeneous in the markets they service and in the methods they use to 
penetrate these markets.  By looking at these differences across lenders, we may be able to learn 
something about what works, and what doesn't work, with regard to servicing minority and low- 
income communities.  Finally, ignoring the heterogeneity of lenders may give an incomplete and 
misleading picture of mortgage market segmentation.  For example, one can imagine a market in 
which some lenders, by working harder to amact minority or low-income loan applicants, actually 
receive -- and deny -- a larger fraction of such customers than might some other lenders. 
Although our analysis reveals substantial differences among lenders in regard to their 
housing market activities, we do not attempt to draw conclusions regarding lender discrimination. 
We emphasize in our discussion that the HMDA data do not contain enough relevant information 
about loan applicants to draw any fm  conclusions regarding the reasons for observed differences 
in denial rates4 
Instead, we take up the broader issue of lender differences in credit flows to minority and 
low-income households:  Does the substantial variance we observe in lenders' credit flows stem 
fundamentally from differences in the volume of minority and low-income applications received by 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlenders, or from differential actions taken on the applications? We conclude that for the United 
States as a whole, the variance across lenders in minority or low-income loan originations, relative 
to total originations, is overwhelmingly accounted for by the variance in application rates to those 
lenders, as opposed to relative differences in the disposition of the applications after they are 
received.  We also find that only a small portion of these differences are due to divergent 
application characteristics that may reflect the type of loan being applied for (loan size, FWA 
or conventional loan, etc.). In addition, they cannot be ascribed solely to geographic differences 
in markets:  Lenders that receive a relatively large proportion of minority applications do so from 
all tracts they serve; lenders that receive a relatively small proportion of minority applications fail 
to do so because, on average, they tend to draw disproportionately fewer minority applicants from 
the tracts they serve. 
How low-income and minority populations or neighborhoods fare in the marketplace for 
consumer and housing finance is an important social concern, and the previous studies on credit 
availability have advanced our understanding of how the markets function.  Based on our 
research, however, we conclude that those who are interested in understanding differences among 
lenders in credit flows to minority and low-income applicants should focus somewhat more on 
applications from, and somewhat less on denials to, those groups.  We intend this paper to be the 
first step of  a research program organized around lenders and the application process. 
11.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
e HMDA Dm 
All commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other mortgage 
lending institutions (primarily mortgage bankers) that have assets of more than $10 million, make 
at least one 1-4 family home purchase loan, and have an ofice in a metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) are required to meet HMDA reporting requirements. Such institutions must file a loan 
application register with the appropriate federal regulatory agency for each calendar year.  The 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmloan register must give the following information for each mortgage application acted upon by the 
institution during the calendar year: 
(1)  the loan amount; 
(2)  the location of the property (state, county, and 1980 census tract number); 
(3)  whether the property is owner-occupied; 
(4)  loan purpose (home purchase, home improvement, or refinancing for 1-4 family or 
mu1 tifa.mil  y); 
(5)  type of loan (conventional,  Federal Housing Administration [FHA], guaranteed by  the 
Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] or Farmers Home Administration [FmHA]); 
(6)  action taken by the lender (loan approved and originated. application approved but 
withdrawn, application denied, application withdrawn before lender action, file closed due 
to incompleteness, loan purchased from another institution); 
(7)  the race and gender of the loan applicant (and co-applicant, if any); 
(8)  the income relied upon by the lending institution in making the loan decision. 
Information on  income, race, and sex of the applicant does not have to be supplied by reporting 
institutions with assets of less than $30 million. 
The data used in this study are those reported for 1990, the first reporting year under the 
new HMDA.  In  total, 9,333 financial institutions made HMDA filings in  19W  of these, 8,761 
provided information on  2,225,983 1-4 family home purchase loan applications in MSAs in which 
they had an office.'  About 10  percent of  these applications (241,295) never reached the stage of 
lender action because they were either withdrawn by the applicant or closed due to 
incompleteness.  This left a total of 1,984,688 loan applications, which constituted the sample for 
most of  the analysis presented in  this study. These loans were originated by 8,745 separate 
lenders operating in 40,008 census tracts in all 340 of the nation's MSAs defined as of  1990. 
Not surprisingly, the initial HMDA fdings contained many errors and inconsistencies that 
required extensive editing by the receiving federal agencies.  Unfortunately, these procedures do 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmnot appear to have been uniformly applied, requiring additional cleaning and editing for this study. 
In addition, smaller institutions were not required to report race, income, and gender for loan 
applicants. It was decided to deal with missing data using a "hot deck" imputation procedure 
similar to that used by the U.S.  Census Bureau.  Applications with missing data were statistically 
matched to applications in the same census tract that came closest to them in reported 
characteristics (race, loan action, income, and loan amount).  Missing values were filled in using 
the variable value of  the matched observation. Applications with implausible reported values 
were treated as missing and imputed in the same way.  Overall, income was imputed for 4.9 
percent, loan amount for 1.5 percent, gender for 4.0 percent, and race for 5.6 percent of the study 
sample applications. 
Sam~le  Statistics 
Applicant statistics for the study sample are given in table 1.6 Mortgage applicants are a 
select sample of American households.  Household mean income ($63,357) was substantially 
higher than that reported for all households in the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finance ($35,700).' 
The racial composition of the study sample also appears to differ from that of  all U.S.  households. 
Blacks constituted 6.2 percent of the mortgage applicants, yet were 7.4 percent of the 
homeowners and headed 11.2 percent of the households in  1990. Similarly. Asians. Native 
Americans, and others were 5.9 percent of the mortgage applicants. but only 2.1 percent of the 
homeowners and 3.0 percent of  the households. Hispanics were more evenly represented:  6.6 
percent of the applicants, 4.1 percent of the homeowners. and 6.4 percent of the households.' 
Mean loan amount requested in  1990 was $97.502. 
Sample characteristics are further broken down by type of lender and applicant in tables 2 
and 3.  Table 2 shows the distribution of  applications, and table 3 shows the distribution of loan 
dollar value.  Lender here is defined at the MSA level. Thus, a lender reporting loans for two 
different MSAs is treated as two different  lender^.^  Lenders are grouped by size and type of 
institution and by  the size and minority population of their MSA.  Applicants are grouped into five 
categories:  (1) total; (2) minority (Native American, Black, and Hispanic); (3) low-income 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(family income less than or equal to $25,000, roughly the bottom 15  percent of applicants); (4) 
residents of minority census tracts (those with more than 30 percent of loan applications from 
minority applicants, roughly 15 percent of applicants); and (5) residents of low-income census 
tracts (those with more than 30 percent of loan applications from low-income applicants, again 
roughly 15  percent of applicants). 
There is little evidence that specific types of institutions, such as commercial banks or 
thrifts, specialize in minority lending, defined either by the race of the applicant or by the racial 
composition of the census tract.  Minority applications followed approximately the same 
distribution as total applications received, with commercial banks taking a slightly smaller share of 
all minority applications and independent mortgage banks taking a slightly larger share.  There is, 
however, some indication of specialization by size of institution.  Lenders receiving more than 500 
home purchase loan applications took in 43 percent of all applications and accounted for 55 
percent of all minority applications, and 57 percent of applications from minority tracts.  This may 
reflect the concentration of large lenders in large MSAs, where there is a high concentration of 
minority applicants and minority tracts.  Within MSAs, there is no evidence that the larger 
institutions (those with market shares exceeding 5 percent) receive a disproportionate share of 
minority applications. 
The picture looks somewhat different for low-income applicants. Commercial banks and 
their subsidiaries receive a disproportionate share of low-income applications, defined either by 
the income of the applicant or by the census tract.  Within MSAs, the largest lenders (those with 5 
percent or more of the market) tend to receive more low-income applications.  However, when 
viewed purely by  size, lenders receiving 500 or more applications tend to receive fewer low- 
income applications. This apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that these lenders 
tend to be located in the largest MSAs, which have relatively low concentrations of  low-income 
mortgage applicants. 
Finally, we note that the measure of minority or low-income lending has little impact on 
the distribution of minority and low-income applications across lenders.  Minority lending defined 
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from minority applicants, or dollar value from minority tracts all reveal the same general pattern. 
The same is true for the various measures of low-income lending. 
Dis~osition  of Loans 
We now turn to the disposition of these of loan applications (see tables 4 and 5, where 
table 5 gives dollar value figures).  In our data set, .85 of all loan applications were approved in 
1990; this is the total approval rate. The approval rate for all minority applicants, the minority 
approval rate, was .75.  We define the relative approval rate (for minorities) as the ratio of these 
two rates (that is, .75/.85 =.88).  Clearly, whenever minority applicants are approved at a lesser 
rate than the entire applicant pool, this rate will be less than one.  But this rate by itself does not 
inform us about the minority proportion of mortgage originations. To calculate this, we also need 
to factor into the equation a term we call the minority application ratio (minority applications as 
a percent of the total). We define the minority origination ratio as the product of the relative 
approval rate and the minority application ratio.  In our national data, for example, the minority 
origination ratio (. 12) equals the relative approval rate (38)  times the minority application ratio 
(. 13).1°  The same arithmetic can be applied to.10~-income  applicants, whose relative approval 
rate is 35. Their origination ratio of .13 is the product of .85 and their application ratio of.  15. 
When the relative approval ratio for a group is less than one, it reduces the proportion of 
group members who become approved applicants relative to their proportion in the original pool 
of all applicants. From this perspective, the relative approval rates shown in table 4, although 
always less than one by type and size class of lender, do not translate into striking differences in 
the distribution of approved applicants when compared with the distribution of the applications 
themselves.  On average, we observe that lenders of all types and sizes originate a share of their 
loans to minority and low-income applicants roughly in proportion to, but quite the same as, the 
share of applications they receive from those groups.  Lurking behind these averages are different 
combinations of these minority application ratios and relative approval rates, generated by 
divergent actions on the part of both applicants and lenders. 
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The previous section describes the average rates of minority and low-income loan 
applications, and the average treatment of those applications by various types of lending 
institutions.  That discussion concerns the performance of the full mortgage market, not of any 
individual lender operating in that market, and ignores the variation across these individual 
lenders.  For the market as a whole, about 12 percent of all loans went to minority applicants and 
13 percent to low-income applicants; however, there is considerable variation in these percentages 
across lenders.  In this section, we compare two possible sources of variance across lenders in 
minority and low-income originations:  dispersion in application ratios and differences in actions 
taken on these applications, as measured by relative approval rates. 
We are motivated to examine these issues because we recognize that there are 
undoubtedly many actions on the part of both applicants and lenders that could generate the 
combinations of application rates, denial rates, and mortgage originations that we observe."  For 
example, take two lenders similar in all respects, except that lender A works hard at marketing 
products to minority and low-income individuals and lender B does not.  Assume further that 
neither lender discriminates against applicants, and that both follow the same underwriting 
standards.  Our analysis of the HMDA data would show lender A with a higher minority 
application rate than lender B.  Their approval rates may differ, however, if the lenders' strategies 
result in different mixes of qualified and unqualified applicants.  Lf lender A's program brings in 
proportionately more marginal applicants, it will end up with higher application rates and lower 
approval rates for the targeted group.  On the other hand, if lender A develops expertise in these 
markets that improves its ability to identify qualified minority and low-income applicants, we may 
tind that it has both a higher minority application rate and a higher approval rate than lender B. 
The same pattern of greater minority and low-income approval rates for institutions with 
higher application rates is consistent with a process of applicants sorting themselves in the credit 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmmarkets.  Again, take the case of two lenders.  Suppose lender A charges a low interest rate for 
mortgage loans, but has tough lending standards. Lender B has easier lending standards, but 
charges a greater interest rate as compensation against the larger risk of default.  Suppose lenders 
approve applicants strictly on economic criteria. Further, suppose that in the population at large, 
minority or low-income status is correlated with loan risk variables such as credit history, work 
history, and wealth.''  If  applicants can identify lender types readily, lender A would receive fewer 
minority and low-income applications than lender B, but might actually have a greater approval 
rate on these applications. On the other hand, if  applicants cannot perfectly identify lenders 
according to their loan-policy types, we would expect to find that lender A's minority or low- 
income approval rates are lower than those of  lender B. 
We want to determine how much diversity exists among lenders in the rates at which they 
receive applications from different population groups, and how much diversity exists in the 
disposition of applications. Furthermore, we would like to know the extent to which credit 
origination differences among lenders stem from the former factor versus the latter. Our inquiry 
extends to the types and sizes of  lenders as well.  Do commercial banks differ from independent 
mortgage banks in regard to the sources of variation in loan origination? Do the largest and most 
urban lenders differ from the others? 
Samole 
In shifting our focus to lenders, the sample of applications and lenders changes fiom the 
one used in the previous section.  The sample used to analyze the variance across lenders in 
minority lending, defined in terms of the number of  minority loans, is described in the fxst row of 
table 6.  The full sample now includes only 11,598 of the 20,695 HMDA-reporting lenders, and 
1.867.2 1 1 of the 1,984,688 applications.  The sample difference results fiom the following 
considerations.  About 40 percent of the 20,695 lenders in our sample report no minority loan 
applications whatsoever.  Since the minority approval rate (minority approvals/minority 
applications) is not defined for these lenders, they are excluded from our analysis.  In addition, we 
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approval rates (minority approval ratehotal approval rate) are not defined for these institutions. 
Lenders that do not receive minority applications or have no loan originations tend to be small, so 
eliminating all applications made to these institutions reduces the sample of applications by  less 
than 6 percent.  Sample statistics for each of our several measures of minority and low-income 
lending are presented in table 6.  Aside from the average size of the lenders and the percent of 
minority applications, the restricted samples are much the same as the full sample discussed in the 
previous section. 
Ignoring distinctions across lenders, the mean ratio of minority to total originations (the 
minority origination ratio) in this adjusted sample is .12, the same as for the full national sample 
reported in table 4.  However, the mean of the individual lender's origination ratios is higher, 
namely .16, because lenders account for different numbers of applications and differ in their own 
application ratios and approval rates.  For example, 959 (8 percent) of the lenders have no 
minority originations, and 357 of them have minority originations only.  Fifty percent of  the 
lenders have minority origination ratios of  .08 or less, while 25 percent have minority origination 
ratios that exceed .18.  The standard deviation of the minority origination ratio is .21, a number 
larger than the mean.  Although the figures are not shown in table 6, the application ratio has a 
mean and standard deviation of.  17 and .20, respectively, whereas comparable statistics for the 
relative approval rates are .87 and -37. 
Model 
Because the minority origination ratios are equal to the product of the application ratios 
and the relative approval rates, the variance of minority origination ratios across lenders, which 
we wish to decompose, is a nonlinear function of the variance of application ratios, the variance of 
relative approval rates, and the covariance between the two.  While the nonlinearity could be 
removed (through an appropriate transformation of the data), the covariance between the two 
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contribution of each component.  The size of the range reflects the influence of the covariance. 
Our estimates of these ranges are based on the following linear regression model: 
(1)  ORIGR, = B, + B2*APPLYRl + B3*RAPPRl + u,, 
where ORIGR, is the minority origination ratio for lender 1  (minority approvalsltotal approvals), 
B, is a separate intercept representing a fixed effect for the metropolitan area in which lender 1 
operates, APPLYR, is the application ratio for lender 1 (minority applicationsltotal  applications), 
and RAPPR, is the relative approval rate for lender 1 (minority approval rateltotal approval rate). 
The MSA fixed effects control for differences in the mortgage lending market that are 
common to all lenders in that market but may vary across markets, such as the size of the minority 
population or lending practices.  The variance associated with MSA is removed from the total 
before we measure the contributions of APPLYR and RAPPR.  Thus, the variance captured by 
APPLYR and RAPPR together is the incremental reduction in the error sum of squares (SS) 
when both are added to the model that already includes the MSA fixed effects. 
The maximum captured by each variable is the reduction in SS (as a share) that occurs 
when the variable is added to a model that includes only the MSA fixed effects; the minimum is 
the reduction when the variable is added to the model that already includes the other variable 
(along with the MSA fixed effects). The minimum is the marginal contribution of each variable, 
thus attributing the entire covariance to the other variable.  The maximum assigns the full 
covariance to the variable in question. 
Results 
The result of this allocation of the variance across lenders in minority lending (defined in 
terms of the number of minority approvals relative to total approvals) is presented in the first line 
of table 7.  We find that the overwhelming majority of the variance in minority originations across 
lenders is attributable to differences in minority application ratios.  Differential approval rates by 
race account for a relatively small portion of the variance across lenders. For the full sample of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm11,598 lenders, 87-91 percent of the variance in minority originations, after controlling for MSA 
differences, is captured by lender-specific differences in minority application rates; 9-13 percent 
stems from different approval rates for these applications. This narrow range suggests the 
contribution of the covariance is quite small, which greatly enhances our ability to identify the 
importance of the application ratios. 
This dominance of differences in lenders' application ratios as the explanation for lender 
variance in minority originations holds across all types of lenders and all sizes, measured in terms 
of both the volume of applications received by the lender and the lender's market share (see table 
8).  The contribution of the relative approval rate component is strongest for mortgage banks 
operating as either subsidiaries of depository institutions or independent firms. Even in this case, 
application rate differences among lenders account for at least three-quarters, and may account 
for as much as 90 percent, of the variance in minority originations.  Furthermore, most of this 
variance across groups of lenders is due to differences in the size of lenders.13 
The smallest conmbution of  minority application ratios to the variance in minority 
originations occurs among small lenders, regardless of the type of  lender.  For the largest lenders 
(those with 500 or more applications), differences in application rates account for 93-99 percent; 
for lenders with less than 100 applications, they account for 85-89 percent.  This is also true when 
size is measured by market share.  Differences in lender minority application rates account for 96- 
97 percent of  the variance across those with 5 percent or more of the market, and for 84-89 
percent across lenders with less than 1 percent of  the market.  When institutions are grouped by 
size and type, we find that the relative conmbution of application ratios to the overall variance for 
any type of lender differs primarily because of lender size. 
As a further check on the robustness of  our result, we consider several different measures 
of  minority lending:  (1) the dollar value of minority loan applications relative to the total dollar 
value of loan applications; (2) the number relative to nonminority loans, (3) the number and dollar 
value of  loan applications from minority tracts relative to those from all tracts; and (4) the number 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof central-city minority loan applications relative to all central-city loan applications.  Similarly 
defined measures of low-income lending are also analyzed.  For each measure, our sample 
includes all lenders for which the origination ratio, application ratio, and relative approval rates 
are defined. The samples used in the analysis of each measure, and the pertinent sample statistics, 
are denoted in table 6. The allocation of variance for these alternative measures of  minority 
lending are presented in rows 2-6 of table 7.14 
The results are virtually identical when dollar values rather than numbers of applications 
are used or when minority census tracts rather than minority applicants are examined.  We 
recognize that it has been more common to compare minority relative to nonminority lending, 
rather than minority relative to total lending, as we have done in this paper.  The results presented 
in table 7 indicate that with the more conventional approach, an even larger portion of the 
variance is attributable to differences in application rates.  We prefer the rninority-relative-to-total 
framework because it tends to put less weight on the lenders with extreme values. 
In the above analysis, we have assumed that the relevant market for lenders is the MSA. 
This may not be true for all lenders.  Some may operate on a small scale, in the rural fringe, or in 
the remote suburbs of  an MSA, where the minority population is very small.  Including these 
lenders in  our sample may introduce additional variance in applications and approvals, which 
reflect differences in the market rather than in individual lenders' response to the market. Our 
findings with regard to large lenders lend some support to our interpretation.  It may be 
reasonable to assume that the MSA  is. or should be. the relevant market for any lender that 
receives more than 500 applications in an MSA  or has a market share greater than 5 percent. 
These are the lenders for which differences  in application rates explain the largest portion of the 
variance in minority approvals. Our conclusions are further supported by an analysis limited to 
central-city lending (row 6 of table 7). Here we conduct the same decomposition as above, but 
restrict our attention to loan applications for properties in centralcity tracts.  As was the case 
with the MSA-level analysis, the majority of the variance in minority origination ratios across 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlenders is attributable to differences in minority application rates, rather than to actions taken on 
these applications. 
Our results concerning low-income lending are much the same as those for minority 
lending (rows 7-12 of table 7, with sample statistics in rows 7- 12 of table 6).  Differences across 
lenders in low-income applications as a share of total applications account for the lion's share of 
differences across lenders in low-income originations as a share of total originations. Again, this 
is true regardless of the type, size, or market share of the institution. The primary difference is 
that the ranges for low-income lending are larger than those for minority lending, indicating that 
the covariance between application ratios and relative approval rates contributes more to the 
variance across lenders in low-income than in minority origination ratios. 
From the above analysis, we conclude that differences in the relative approval rates of 
minority and low-income loans account for only a small portion of the variance across institutions 
in the share of originations going to minority and low-income applicants. However. applications 
to lenders and lenders' actions on these applications are almost certainly interrelated. The 
applicant's decision of where to apply is probably influenced by the action he or she expects from 
the lender.  In our sample, we find a positive correlation across lenders between minority 
application ratios and relative approval rates.  This is consistent with minorities choosing to apply 
at institutions they perceive will treat them more favorably. A full examination of this issue, 
however, requires an understanding of the application decision that is beyond the scope of our 
current paper. 
IV.  FURTHER EVALUATION OF LENDER DIFFERENCES IN ORIGINATIONS 
In section 111,  we found that the majority of the variance among lenders in minority loan 
originations is attributable to differences in minority application ratios, although relative 
differences in the disposition of  minority applications also contribute somewhat to the observed 
variance.  The question remains as to what accounts for these lender differences in application 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmratios and relative approval rates.  One possible explanation is that lenders specialize in specific 
markets identified by either loan products or geographic areas. These markets could be 
distinguished from one another by such application characteristics as loan size, applicant income, 
loan type (such as FHWA  or conventional), and property location. To the extent that these 
characteristics are correlated with race, this specialization will contribute to the observed variance 
across lenders in the percent of minority applications received. Similarly, to the extent that these 
characteristics are correlated with creditworthiness, they may also contribute to the observed 
differences in relative approval rates.  In this section, we examine the application characteristics 
and property location factors to determine their roles in creating the differences we observe 
among lenders in their minority application ratios and relative approval rates. 
. .  Decomwos~hon  of Minority Application Rat= 
For each lender, we partition the minority application ratio into three components: the 
portion attributable to differences in the application characteristics (for example, loan size, loan 
type), the portion attributable to the geographic market served by that lender (both MSA and 
census tract), and the portion attributable to pure lender effects.  For each lender, the first two 
components are measured by the racial mix of applications predicted on the basis of the market 
served, where the lender's market is defined by the nonracial characteristics of the applications 
that the lender actually receives, and by the MSA and census tracts from which it draws 
applications. As an example of the first component, suppose the only relevant application 
characteristic is loan type (FHANA or conventional) and that in one lender's market, minorities 
comprise half of  all FHANA applicants and one-tenth of all conventional loan applicants. If the 
data show that a lender's applications are split 30 percent FHANA and 70 percent conventional, 
we would predict, based solely on loan type. that 22 percent of this lender's applications would be 
from minority applicants (.3*.5 + .7*. 1 = .22). The second component is derived from a similar 
comparison of  the lender's geographic mix of applications and its market's composition of 
rninority applicants. The third component, the pure lender effect, is measured by each lender's 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmdeviation from what we would predict based on the first two components alone; that is, its 
propensity to draw a higher or lower percentage of minority applicants than is typical for lenders 
active in its market. 
The procedure we use to construct the three components is by necessity based on 
characteristics reported under HMDA.  The full 1,984,688 loan sample is used to estimate a fixed- 
effects linear probability model. The dependent variable is coded one if the applicant was a 
minority (Native American, Black, or Hispanic) and zero otherwise.  Independent variables 
include gender, marital status, occupancy, income, loan amount, income-to-loan-ratio, loan type, 
and interactions among these variables. In  addition, 607,63  1 separate intercepts for each 
combination of lender and census &ct  are included as fixed effects.''  The resulting coefficient 
estimates are reported in appendix table 12. 
Although the regression shown in appendix table 12  separates applicant-specific factors 
from those representing location and institutions, the effects of lender, MSA, and tract are still 
intertwined in the fixed-effects dummies. These were separated using an iterative procedure 
equivalent to regressing values of the 607,63 1 fixed-effects intercepts against the 340 MSA, 
40,008 tract, and 20,695 institution dummies. 
The  computation of separate applicant, tract, and lender effects for each application allows 
the average difference in the race of applicants to be assigned to various sources.  The predictive 
model estimated for the race of the applicant has the form 
(2)  Race,  = AC, + MSL  + T, + LO, + e,, 
where Race is one if the ith applicant using the lth lender in the mth MSA and cth census tract is a 
minority and zero otherwise, AC are the applicant's economic characteristics, MSA is the MSA 
effect, T is  the tract effect, LO is the overall lender effect, and e is a residual. Table 9 shows the 
decomposition of the average difference in the race of applicants using such a model.16 
Loan  application characteristics and the overall lender effect are unhelpful in predicting an 
applicant's race; the tract and MSA effects are more useful, contributing 22.7 percent and 8.7 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpercent, respectively, to the prediction."  However, a large portion (63.9 percent) of the race of 
the applicants cannot be predicted with these variables.  This can be interpreted as a within- 
lender-tract-MSA residual. 
So far, we have fully exploited the HMDA data at the application level to assess the 
connection between both application characteristics and property locations, and race.  Now we 
can recompile these individual applications back into the lenders' portfolios, enabling us to address 
the question of how much of the cross-lender variance in the racial mix of applicant pools can be 
attributed to differences in the application characteristics and census tracts served by each lender. 
We can also assess how much of the variance stems from pure lender differences. This 
decomposition of variance is similar to that conducted in the previous section. The percent of 
minority applications for each lender is regressed against the percent minority predicted by our 
model using the lender's application characteristics, census tracts served, and a lender residual. 
We approximate the effect of each component by regressing it separately against the dependent 
variable and by  computing the reduction in the explanatory power of the full equation when each 
component is dropped. 
Table 10 shows the sources of variation across lenders in the racial composition of their 
applications."  Differences in application characteristics account for 0.8 to 2.6 percent of the 
within-MSA variance across lenders.  Much more surprisingly, differences in the census tracts 
from which lenders receive applications account for only 21.9 to 28.9 percent of the variation, 
with 70.8 to 74.8 percent of the variation across lenders unexplained.  This means that most of the 
variation across lenders in the number of minority applications received does not stem from the 
fact that they serve different neighborhoods, butfrom how they draw applicants within 
neighborhoods. This result, which is robust to a number of variations, such as ignoring MSA 
effects or weighting the regression by number of applications received by  the lender, runs counter 
to the conventional wisdom that neighborhood service areas are the major cause of cross-lender 
variation in the proportion of minority applications received.19 
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We now turn to an analysis of institutional differences in the relative approval rates of 
minority and nonrninority loan applicants.  This approach is similar to that used to decompose 
variation in lender minority application rates.  We first estimate a model to predict the likelihood 
that an individual loan application would be denied based on objective characteristics independent 
of  which lender receives the application. We then calculate the extent to which individual lenders 
deviate ~ystematically  from this predicted denial rate. 
The sample and methodology used are almost identical to that used to decompose 
variation in lender application rates.  The full 1,984,688 loan sample is used to estimate a fixed- 
effects linear probability model.  The dependent variable is coded zero if the application was 
approved and one otherwise. Independent variables represent all those used in the minority 
equation plus dummy variables for six applicant and two co-applicant racial categories. The racial 
dummies are also interacted with FHA and VA loan dummies. We include separate intercepts for 
each combination of lender and census tract.  Again, there are 607,63 1 unique combinations of 
the 40,008 tracts and 20,695 lenders in the sample, and an iterative procedure is used to solve for 
individual lender, MSA, and tract effects in a second stage of the analysis. 
The resulting regression is reported in appendix table 13.  A positive coefficient can be 
interpreted as the expected rise in the probability that an applicant's loan would be denied 
resulting from a one-unit increase in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant 
-- specifically, the applicant's MSA, census tract, and lender. Thus, the coefficients on race, for 
example, represent the expected difference in the probability that a white and black applicant with 
the same income, gender, FHANA status, loan amount, MSA, census tract, and lender will have 
their loan application denied. Thus interpreted, the estimated blackfwhite (. 103) and 
Hispaniclwhite (.048) differences for conventional loans are quite significant  Differences are 
similar for FHA loans (. 116 and .030). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe computation of  separate applicant, MSA, tract, and lender effects for each application 
allows the average difference in the denial rate of minority and nonrninority applicants to be 
assigned to various sources. The predictive model estimated for application denial has the fom 
(3)  Denial-,  = ACi + MS&  + T, + LO, + e-,, 
where Denial is one if the ith applicant using the lth lender in the mth MSA and cth census tract is 
denied, and zero otherwise, AC are the applicant's economic characteristics (as measured with all 
applicants assumed to be white), T is the tract effect, LO is the overall lender effect, and e is a 
residual.  Table 1 1 shows the decomposition of  the average difference in the denial rates of 
minority and nonminority applicants using such a model. 
i 
On average, 25.2 percent of minority loan applications were denied versus 13.1 percent of 
nonminority applications. Less than one-seventh of the gross difference in denial rates (12.1 
percent) can be attributed to differences in applicants' economic characteristics (as measured by 
predicted values from the denial regression).  MSA, census tract, and overall lender effects, as 
measured by  average differences in the MSA, tract, and institution dummies associated with each 
type of applicant, account for just over one-quarter of the difference (3.511 2.1).  The portion 
attributable to racial sorting (that is, minorities applying to lenders with higher minority approval 
rates and nonrninorities applying to lenders with lower minority approval rates) is very small (only 
.2 percent). The major portion of the difference remains unexplained and cannot be attributed to 
any of these sources.  This unexplained race differential may be due to differences in credit 
histories, employment histories, loan-to-value ratios, or other factors considered in the loan 
evaluation process that are not included in the HMDA file, or to differential treatment based 
solely on the race of  the applicant. 
The predictive equation is used to examine the source of variation in the disposition of 
applications across lenders.  Table 12 shows this decomposition. The ratio of the approval rate of 
minorities to that of all applicants for each lender is regressed against two variables computed 
separately for the minority and total applicants of each lender: (1) the portion attributable to 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmapplication characteristics as measured by the predicted value from the denial regression 
(assigning all applicants to the same race); and (2) the portion attributable to property location. 
Again, because we are looking at a decomposition of variance, the amount charged to each source 
can only be approximated. These regressions are performed on within-MSA data; between-MSA 
variations are thus removed. 
Between 2.4 and 4.6 percent of the variation in relative approval rates across lenders 
within MSAs can be attributed to variation in the application characteristics. Location accounts 
for between 4.0 and 5.9 percent of the variation. The overwhelming majority of variation (91.0 to 
92.7 percent) cannot be explained by these factors. 
Similar conclusions are reached when we examine sources of variation in the minority 
approval rate (table 13). Applicant economic and census tract effects are small. The overall 
credit standard of the institution explains about one-third of the within-MSA variation (that is, 
minorities tend to apply to institutions with relatively large denial rates for all applicants, ceteris 
paribus). However, more than half of the variation in minority approval rates cannot be explained 
by  any of these factors. These remaining differences may reflect lender bias or differences in the 
unobserved characteristics of the loan application. Without additional information, it is impossible 
to son out these two possibilities.  It appears that this component of largely unexplained variation 
is consistent with evidence of significant idiosyncratic lender behavior.  As shown in table 14, 
almost 90 percent of the within-MSA variation in total lender approval rates cannot be explained 
by  either applicant characteristics (as we measure them) or by neighborhood. 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses recently released HMDA data to examine differences in minority and low- 
income lending patterns across lending institutions. The new data allow us to identify both the 
application and the action taken on that application by the lender, thus enabling us to sort out 
lender behavior from applicant behavior to a greater extent than allowed by previous data. This 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpermits us to determine the extent to which the differences across lenders in minority and low- 
income originations, found in earlier studies, reflect differences in minority (low-income) 
application rates across lenders as opposed to differences across institutions in their minority 
(low-income) approval rates relative to their overall approval rates. 
We find that the overwhelming majority of the variance across lenders in both minority 
and low-income originations is attributable to differences in application ratios.  Differences in 
relative approval rates account for a relatively small portion of the variance across lenders.  For 
the full sample, 87-91 percent of the variance in minority originations is captured by lender- 
specific differences in minority application rates, while only 10-13 percent stems from differential 
treatment of these applications. The dominance of variations in lenders' application rates as the 
explanation for lender differences in minority and low-income originations holds for all types of 
institutions, for different lender sizes, for different lender market shares, and for various 
definitions of  the relevant market (full MSA and central city only). 
The public's interest in examining the relative rates at which lenders in an MSA approve 
credit applications for one group versus another emanates from a suspicion that some lenders 
might discriminate.  Denying credit to applicants because of their race is illegal, as is refusing to 
lend strictly on  the basis of property location.  Regulatory agencies charged with enforcing equal 
credit laws and CRA can benefit from analyzing lender-specific HMDA data, including relative 
approval rates. in an effort to spot illegal practices.  Our research indicates that lenders vary 
enormously in terms of their relationships with minority and low-income applicants.  These 
differences may result from illegal practices, or simply from economic factors on both sides of the 
market.  Regulators and the public need to attain a better understanding of the variation in lenders' 
practices before reaching conclusions about how well or poorly the markets function for all 
applicants. 
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1.  For  a  taste  of  the  media's  approach  to  the  issue,  see  "The  Color  of  Money,"  Atlanta 
Constitution, May 1-6, 1988, and "The Race for Money," Detroit Free Press, June 24-27, 1988. 
2.  Canner, Gabriel, and Wooley (1990), Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991), and Duca and Rosenthal 
(1992) study racial aspects of  credit rationing and  market performance by  using data from the 
Survey  of  Consumer  Finances,  which  comprises  information  collected  from  a  sample  of 
households.  These studies attempt to infer from the households' experiences and  demographic 
characteristics whether lenders as a group treat people differently as a result of their racial status. 
3. Canner (l981), Avery and Buynak (l981), Avery and Canner (1983), and Bradbury, Case, and 
Dunham (1989) contrast the differences in  mortgage credit originations between predominantly 
white and predominantly minority neighborhoods in various metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). 
These studies use either pre-1990 HMDA data or lien title data to infer from the neighborhoods' 
characteristics whether mortgage lenders as a group treat neighborhoods differently depending on 
their racial composition.  Shafer and Ladd  (1981) collect information on  some lender-specific, 
individual mortgage loan applications in  New  York and  California, but  they aggregate the data 
over lenders within MSAs to examine the credit denial actions of  lenders as a group within these 
markets.  Calem  (1992)  contrasts  the  experiences  of  individual  lenders  participating  in  a 
Philadelphia area  mortgage-lending plan  with  those that  did  not  participate.  His  paper  does 
document the existence of  lender differences in the penetration of  minority communities, but the 
primary focus is on  the characteristics of  the voluntary mortgage plan  operated by  a group of 
lenders.  Avery (1989) notes the differences between studies based on lending in a neighborhood 
and the lending procedures adopted by  individual lenders. 
4.  These data may  be  useful  when  used in  conjunction with other data, such as those collected 
from regulatory audits.  In  addition, regulators can employ the information as a tool in  signaling 
potential problem lenders.  For a thorough discussion of  both the issues and data, see Mumell et 
al. (1992). 
5.  We decided to resmct  the analysis to  1-4 family home  purchase loans within MSAs, which 
were  directly  acted  upon  by  the  reporting  institution.  Overall,  the  institutions  reported 
information on  6,595,089 loan  applications in  1990.  Of  these, 3,933,919 (59.6 percent) were 
originated by  the reporting institution within an  MSA  in which they had an ofice (of the excluded 
loans, 1,137,74  1 were purchased from other institutions and 1,523,429 were outside an MSA).  A 
significant portion of  the loans remaining,  1,707,936, were for home improvements, refinancing, 
or  multifamily residences.  This left a total  of 2,225,983 loan  applications that met  the study 
criteria. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm6. We examine only 1-4 family home purchase loans in this study.  In addition to these loans, a 
total of  787,952 home improvement loans, 716,595 refinancings of  1-4 family home loans, and 
32,176 multifamily home loans met the same criteria used for the study sample (originated by the 
reporting institution within an MSA where it has an office and where the lender made a decision 
on the application). 
7. Household income of sample applicants may be higher, because this figure represents only the 
applicant's income used for mortgage qualification. 
8. The percent  Hispanic  in  the HMDA  sample is slightly higher than  that in  the overall U.S. 
population, due in  part to the inclusion of  Puerto Rico, and the percent black is slightly lower. 
U.S.  figures are  taken  from  the  whole  1990 Census,  which  may  differ  somewhat  from  the 
coverage of the study sample in that rural areas are included. 
9. The 8,745 financial institutions filing  1990 HMDA  reports that had  at least one loan in the 
study sample operated  in  an average of  2.4  MSAs.  This translated into 20,695 study lenders 
when lenders were defied at the MSA level. 
10. Note  that we define the origination ratio in  terms of  loans approved, even though a small 
number of loans that are approved are not originated due to withdrawals by the applicants. 
11. See ICF,  Inc.  (1991) for a discussion of  how  some mortgage lenders regard  the lending 
process as different for members of disadvantaged groups. 
12. Avery. Elliehausen. Gustafson. and Canner (1984) and Canner and Luckett (1991) report on 
these differences. 
13. Unreported estimates by  type  and  size of  lender indicate that the variance is  largest for the 
smallest  lenders,  those  with  fewer  than  100 applications.  For  other  Ienders,  the  variance 
decomposition matches the reported figures. 
14. Analyses of variance for each measure by  type of lender. size of lender, size of MSA, and size 
of MSA minority populations are presented in appendix tables 1-1  1. 
15. The model was actually estimated using deviations about the means, which is computationally 
equivalent to adding intercepts.  There were 607.631  unique combinations of  the 40,008 tracts 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmand 20,695 lenders in the sample spread across 340 MSAs; thus, the average tract had about 15 
lenders, each of whom served about 30 tracts per MSA. 
16. The figures in  table 9 (and subsequent tables 10-14) are based only on data fiom the 11,598 
lenders who had  at least one minority applicant and  at least one loan approval.  The decision to 
use a subsample was made in  order to make results in  this section more comparable with those of 
the previous section. 
17. It is commonly recognized that a more complete accounting of loan application characteristics 
would  contribute substantially to the explanatory power of this procedure.  See Munnell  et al. 
(1992), especially table 6 therein, for evidence of this. 
18. The analysis-of-variance figures in tables  10,  12 and  13 are computed fiom the remaining 
variance across lenders after MSA effects are removed. 
19. The potential contribution of  census tracts is larger when  the regression is weighted by  the 
number of applications each lender received.  Since this decomposition focuses on within-MSA 
variation and  gives most weight to the largest lenders within the MSA, it  is difficult  to separate 
the lender effect fiom the census tract effect.  As a result of the covariance between the two, the 
range of the contribution of each is quite large (27-69 percent for census tracts and 30-63 percent 
for lender effects).  We note that even in  this decomposition (the most favorable case for census 
tract effects), at  least 30 percent of the variance across lenders cannot be accounted for by  loan 
application characteristics or by  the racial composition of the neighborhood fiom which the lender 
draws applications. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1:  Characteristics of Mortgage Applications  for the Purchase of 1-4 Family Homes, 1990 mA 
Number  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent 
of Sample  of Loan S  of Accepts of Denials 







Race of Co-applicant 
No Co-applicant  563.559 
Same Race as Applicant  1,377,108 
Different Race than Applicant  44,021 
Gender 
Male Applicant, Fomalm Co-applicant  1,270,696 
Fomalm Applicant, Male Co-applicant  85.272 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  40,403 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant  24,758 
Male Applicant. No Co-applicant  336,005 
Female Applicant, No Co-applicant  227,554 








Loan Kept by Originator 
Loan Sold to FNMA 
Loan Sold to GNMA 
Loan Sold To FHuc 
Loan Sold Elsewhere 
Loan Accepted and Withdrawn 
Loan Denied 
Reasons for Denial (of Loans 








Mortgage Insurance Denied 
Other 
1 Up to three reasons for danial could be given, and answers were voluntary.  Each category row 
displays the percent of all denied applications listing that particular reason as one of the Lhrme. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2:  Dirtrlbution of 1-4  Funlly Hortgsga Applications by Type and Siza of Lender. 1990 BIlDA 
Number of  Percent of Applications 
~endersl  Applications  All  Minority  Low-Income  Minority  Low-Income 
~~~licants~  ~p~licants~  Tracts4  ~racts5 
TYPO  of Inrtitution 
Comnercial Bank8  7.043  447.526  22.6%  18.9%  30.9%  18.6%  32.7% 
Thrift Inrtitutionr  3.975  667.513  33.6  35.0  24.7  35.2  22.6 
Credit Unions  1;  627  20;  839  1.1  .7  1.1  .7  1.2 
Bank Subridiaries  3,532  389,250  19.6  18.7  23.4  18.1  22.4 
Thrift Subsidiaries  1,478  154,820  7.8  8.3  8.3  8.2  8.5 
Other hrt8age  Banks  3.040  304,740  15.4  18.3  12.3  18.2  12.6 
Size of Institution 
>  500 Application8  774  853.319  43.0  55.2  34.7  57.0  29.8 
100-500  Applications  3.628  795.477  40.1  32.7  45.4  31.1  48.6 
<  100 Application8  16,293  335,892  16.9  12.1  19.9  11.9  21.6 
Market Share of Inrtitution 
More than 5 Percent  1,816  813,279  41.0  43.6  46.2  42.5  49.2 
1-5 Percent  4,441  811,086  40.9  40.5  38.8  40.6  37.9 
Laar than 1  Percent  14,338  360,323  18.2  15.8  15.0  17.0  12.9 
Size of  FSA 
>  25.000 Applications  3,545  660,927  33.3  45.3  19.1  49.7  12.3 
<  25,000 Applications  17.150  1,323,761  66.7  54.7  80.  9  50.3  87.7 
Percent Minorit7  Auvlicationa  in M 
More than 22 Percent  2.055  281,863  14.2  33.9  11.2  45.3  11.4 
Lers than 22 Percent  18.840  1,702,825  85.8  66.1  88.8  54.7  88.6 
Lenderr operatin8 in multiple Ws  are treated as separate institutions. 
Native Americans , Blocks, and Birpanics. 
Applicant income 1.88  than or equal to 925,000. 
Cenrus tractr with 30 parcant or more of loan applications from minority applicants. 
Cen8ur tractr with 30 percent or more of loan applications from low-income applicants. 
Source:  Authorr. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3:  .Distribution  of Dollar Value of 1-4  'Family  Mort6a6e Applications by  Type and Size of 
Lmder. 1990 IPDA 
Number of  Total Loan  Percent of Applications 
~endersl  hunt(S1000s)  All  Minority  Lw-Income  Minority  Low-Income 
~pplicants~ ~~~licants~  Tracts4  ~ract.8~ 
ke  of Institution 
Coamercial Banks  7,043  $39.281  20.3%  16.3%  25.6%  17.0%  28.8 
Thrift Inatitutions  3.975  73.349  37.9  42.3  27.2  42.6  ,  23.2 
Credit Unions  1.627  1,582  .8  .5  .9  .5  1.1 
Bank Subsidiaries  3.532  34,706  17.9  15.5  23.2  14.6  23.0 
Thrift Subsidiaries  1,478  14,792  7.6  7.6  8.1  7.5  9.0 
Other Mort6a6e Banks  3,040  29,800  15.4  17.7  15.0  17.8  14.9 
Size of Institution 
> 500 Applications  774  93,769  48.5  61.7  39.9  64.4  31.2 
100-500  Applications  3,628  70,195  36.3  28.0  43.2  25.9  48.8 
<  100 Applications  16,293  29.551  15.3  10.3  16.9  9.6  20.0 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent  1.916  73,312  37.9  43.0  46.2  42.5  49.4 
1-5  Percent  4,441  80,926  41.8  40.4  39.1  40.3  38.1 
Less than 1 Percent  14.338  39,272  20.3  16.6  14.7  17.3  12.5 
Size of EISA 
> 25,000 Applications  3,545  82.784  42.8  56.3  24.9  61.1  13.8 
<  25,000 Applications 17,150  110,727  57.2  43.7  75.1  38.9  86.2 
Percent Minority Applications in ?SA 
More than 22 Percent  2.055  36,841  19.0  39.6  13.6  53.8  12.5 
Less than 22 Percent  18,640  156,670  81.0  60.4  86.4  46.2  87.5 
Lenders operating in multiple =As  are treated as separate institutions. 
Native Americans, Blacks, and Eispanica. 
Applicant income less than or equal to  ,S25.000. 
Cenaua tracts with 30 percent or more of loan applications from minority applicants. 
Census tracts with 30 percent or more of loan applications from lw-income applicants. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4:  Minority and Lor-Income Lendins Relative to Total 1-4 Family Mortaga Lending, 1990 HMDA 
Overall  ~inorityl  LOW 1ncome2 
Approval  Percent of  Approval  Relative  Percent of  Approval Relative 
Rate  Appls .  Approval8  Rate  Rate  Appls.  Approval8  Rate  Rate 
fype of XnrtitutioQ 
Coamerciel Banks  .82  11.21 
Thrift Institutions  .87  13.9 
Credit Unions  .89  9.0 
Bank Subsidierias  .84  12.7 
Thrift Subsidiaries  .86  14.2 
Other )brt&e&e Banks  .87  15.9 
Sixa of Instltutto~ 
+  500 Applications  .86  17.1 
100-500 Applicetlonr  .85  10.9 
<  100 Applications  .84  9.5 
- 
Market Share of Institutions 
Nora than 5 Percent  .86  14.2 
1-5 Percent  .85  13.2 
La88 than 1 Percent  .84  11.6 
Size of tEq 
z  25,000 Applications  .86  18.1 
<  25.000 Applications  .85  10.9 
Percent Minority A~~licetionr  in *A 
Nora than 22 Percent  .80  31.8 
La88 than 22 Percent  .86  10.3 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5: Minority and Lou-Income  Lending Relative to Total 1-4 Famlly Mortgage Lending,  Dollars of Loans, 1990 WA 
Ovrrrll  ~inoritvl  ~orr  1ncome2 
Approval  Percent of  Approval  Relative  Percent of  Approval  Relative 
Rate  Applr.  Approvals  Rate  Rate  Appls  .  Approvals  Rate  Rate 
Thrift Inrtitutionr  .88  13.2  12.0 
Credit Unionr  .90  7.5  6.7 
Bank Subridiarler  .88  10.2  9.1 
Thrift Subridiarler  .87  11.7  10.2 
Other Cbrtgage  Bankr  .87  13.6  12.4  - 
>  500 Applications  .07  15.1  13.7  .79  .91  5.2  4.6  .76  .87 
100-500 Application8  .87  9.1  7.9  .75  .87  7.6  6.6  .76  .87 
<  100 Applications  .88  7.7  6.8  .75  .89  7.0  6.0  .73  .85 
Wrket  Share of Inrtitutionr 
Cbre than 5 Percent  .08  13.4  11.9  .77  .88  7.7  6.7  .76  .87 
1-5  Percmt  .87  11.4  10.3  .78  .90  5.9  4.0  .75  .86 
Lerr thon 1 Percmt  .85  9.7  8.6  .75  .89  4.6  5.1  -73  .86 
shu!Lm 
>  25.000 Applications  .80  15.5  14.2  .79  .92  8.3  7.2  .75  .87 
<  25.000  Application8  -87  9.0  7.8  .78  .87  3.7  3.7  .76  .87 
PLfc*nt Mh~Uu?mlicrtlonr in W4 
More than 22 Percont  .82  24.6  23.0  .77  .94  4.5  3.9  .70  .85 
Lor8 than 22 Percent  .88  8.8  7.8  .78  .89  6.8  5.9  .76  .87 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6:  Sample Statistics for Analysis of Verirnce in Origination Ratios across Lenders, lggO IWlA 
Ori~ination  Ratio 
Number of  Number of  Percent  Strndud 




number ~elativ*  to 













Dollu  Value 
Central City Low-Income 
Numb.  r 
Lenders operating in multiple FSAa  ue  treated as separate institutions.  This includes 
only those lenders with at least one minority  applicant and at least one lorn acceptmco. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTabla 7:  Su~rmary  of Analysis of Origination  Ratios across Lenders, 1990 BMDA 
Percant Attributable to 
Std. Dav.  to Varianca in2 
of 
Origination  Application  Ralativo 
~atiol  ~-s~uarel  Rati  o  Approval hta 
Minority 
Number 
Dollar Value (1)  -18  .91  87.4-91.1  8.9-12.6 
Number Relative to 
Nominority (2)  1.59  .94  99.3-99.3  .7-.  7 
Minority Tracts 
Numbar (3)  -19  .91  88.7-91.9  8.1-11.3 
Dollar Value (4)  .19  .91  89.7-92.2  7.8-10.3 
Central City Minority 
Number (5)  .22  .93  82.5-88.5  11.5-17.5 
Low-Income 
Number (6) 
Dollar Value (7) 
Number Relative to 
Non-Low-Income (8)  .52  .79  89.2-91.5  8.5-10.8 
Low-Income Tracts 
Number (9) 
Dollar Valua (10) 
Central City Low-Incme 
Number (11)  .23  .93  81.7-85.8  14.2-18.3 
Note: Analyaea of variance by typo of lander. air@ of landor. air.  of FSA.  and aira 
of ).M  minority population are reported in appendix tablea indicated in parantheaea. 
Expressed as deviation around t.M  means. 
Minimum and maximum contributions to variance based on deviations around FSA  means. 
Source:  Authors 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 8:  Allocation of Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Number of  Minority 
Originations. 1990 RMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  ~-~~uare~  Minority  Relative 
~endersl  ~atiol  Applications  Approval Rate 
Type of Institution 
Comnercial Banks 
Thrift Institutions  2.689  .14  .93  92.0-93.9  6.1-8.0 
Credit Unions  551  .29  .97  85.2-93.1  6.9-14.8 
Bank Subsidiaries  2,059  .15  .88  80.4-83.4  16.6-19.6 
Thrift Subsidiaries  818  .18  .90  74.2-81.7  18.3-25.8 
Other Mortgage Banks  1,866  .18  .94  86.5-90.2  9.8-13.5 
Size of Institution 
>  500 Applications  774  .09  .99  92.8-98.8  1.2-7.2 
100-500 Applications  3.488  .08  .96  96.5-98.0  2.0-3.5 
<  100 Applications  7,336  .21  .92  85.0-89.3  10.7-15.0 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent  1.785  .07  .95  95.7-97.3  2.7-4.3 
1-5 Percent  3,619  .09  .93  92.8-94.1  5.9-7.2 
Less Than 1 Percent  6.194  .22  ;  92  84.0-88.7  11.3-16.0 
Size of MSA 
>  25,000  Applications  2.225  .20  .94  86.4-91.0  9.0-13.6 
c 25.000 Applications  9,373  .17  .91  86.6-90.4  9.6-13.4 
Percent Minority A~plications 
More than 22 Percent  1,484  .24  .94  76.6-86.8  13.2-23.4 
Less than 22 Percent  10,114  .17  .92  87.7-91.0  9.0-12.2 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved loans to minority applicants as e percent of a11 apprwed 
loans. 
Lenders operating in multiple MSAs are treated as separate institutions.  This includes 
only those lenders with st least one minority applicant and at leaat one loan acceptance. 
Expressed as a deviation around lSA  means, 
Minimum and maximum contributions to variance basad on deviations around ).M means. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 9:  Percentage of Average Applicant Pool--Racial 
Differencea Attributable to Various Sources, 1990 EIMDA 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  1.22 
MSA Effect  8.7 
Census Tract  22.7 
Pure Lender Effect  3.5 
Unexplained  63.9 
Total Difference  100.0 
Table 10:  Allocation of Institutional Differences in Minority 
Application Rates, Deviations about MSA Means,  1990 BMDA 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  0.8-2.62 
Census Tract  21.9-28.9 
Unexplained Lender Effect  70.8-74.8 
Table 11:  Difference in Average Minority  and Nominority Percentage 
Denial Rates Attributable to Various Sources, 1990 BMDA 
Total 
Nonminori  ty Applicants 
Percent of Nominorities 




Census Tract Effect 
Overall Lender Effect 
Residual (Unexplained) 
Minority ~uplicantal 
Percent of Minoritiea 




Census Tract Effect 
Overall Lender Effect 
Residual (Unexplained) 
Native Americana, Blacks. and Hispanics. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 12:  Allocation of Institutional Differences in Relative 
Approval Rates, Deviations about MSA Means, 1990 BMDA 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  2.4-4.62 
Census Tract  4.0-5.9 
Unexplained Lender Effect  91.0-92.7 
Table 13:  Allocation of Institutional Differences in Minority 
Approval Rates. Deviations about MSA Means, 1990 BMDA 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  2.5-5.72 
Census Tract  3.6-4.2 
Overall Lender Effect  .  26.4-38.3 
Unexplained Lender Effect  53.8-65.9 
Table 14:  Allocation of Institutional  Differences in Total 
Approval Rates, Deviations about MSA Means, 1990 EMDA 
Applicant Economic 
Characteristics  3.4-10.9% 
Census Tract  2.0-3.2 
Unexplained Lender Effect  88.7-91.1 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 1:  Allocation of Variance in Origination Ratio.  across Lenders:  Dollar Value of 
Minority Originations, 1990 EMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  ~-S~uare~  2  Minority  Relative 
~endersl  ~atio~  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
>  500 Applications 
'100-500  Applications 
<  100 Applications 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent 
1-5 Percent 
Less than 1 Percent 
Size of USA 
>  25,000 Applications 
25,000  Applications 
Percent Minority Auplications 
More than 22  Percent 
Less than 22  Percent 
Dependent Variable:  Dollar value of approved loans to minority applicants as a percent of all 
approved loans. 
Lenders operating in multiple MSAs are treated as separate institutions.  This include.  only 
those lenders with at  least one minority applicant and at least one loan acceptance. 
Expressed as a deviation around MSA means. 
Minimum and maximum contributions to variance based on deviations around U5A  means. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 2:  Allocation of  Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Number of  Minority 
Tract Originations, 1990  BMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  R-square2  X  Minority  Relative 
~endersl  Ratio2  Applications  Approval Rate 
be  of Institution 
Ccnmnercial Banks  2,676  .22  .92  89-93%  7-11% 
Thrift Institutions  2,093  .14  .93  92-85  5-8 
Credit Union.  458  .26  .96  88-92  8-12 
Bank Subsidiaries  1,566  .15  .86  85-86  14-15 
Thrift Subsidiaries  648  .20  .88  73-78  22-27 
Other Mortgage Banks  1,405  -19  .93  88-92  8-12 
Size of Institutio~ 
>  500  Applications  734  .09  .99  98-100  0-2 
100-500  Applications  2,775  .10  .97  98-99  1-2 
<  100  Applications  5,337  .23  .91  86-90  10-14 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5  Percent  1.224  .08  .95  97-98 
1-5  Percent  2.753  .ll  .95  96-97 
Leas than 1 Percent  4,869  .23  .91  86-90 
Size of tSA 
z  25.000  Applications  2.027  .22  .94  89-92 
<  25.000  Applications  6.819  -18  .91  88-91 
Percent Minority Applications 
More than 22  Percent  1.575  .24  .95  83-88  12-17 
Less than 22  Percent  7.271  .18  .81  89-92  8-11 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved loans for properties in census tracts where 30  percent or 
more of the applicants are minorities as a percent of a11 approved loans. 
Lenders operatiw in multiple PSAs  are treated as separate institutions.  This include.  only 
thorn.  lenders with at leaat one minority applicant and at least one loan acceptance. 
Erpreaaed as a deviation around ).ISA  means. 
flini-  and rui-  contributions to variance based on deviations around ).ISA  means. 
Source:  Authors 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 3:  Allocation of Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Dollar Value of 
Minority Tract Originations, 1990 HHDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Oriaination  R-Square2  X  Minority  Relative 
~endersl  Ilatio2  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
z  500  Applications  734  .08  .99  96-100 
100-500  Applications  2,775  .09  .97  98-99 
<  100  Applications  5,337  .23  -91  09-91 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5  Percent  1,224  .08  .Q6  97-99  1-3 
1-5  Percent  2,753  -10  .95  97-98  2-3 
Less than 1  Percent  4.869  .24  .Q1  88-90  10-12 
Size of MSA 
z  25.000  Applications  2,027  .22  .94  09-91  Q-11 
< 25.000 Applications  6,819  -18  .  QO  QO-92  8-10 
Percent Minority ADDlications 
More than 22 Percent  1,575  .26  .B5  87-89  11-13 
Less than 22 Percent  7.271  -18  .91  90-92  6-10 
Dependent Variable:  Dollar value of approved loans for properties in census tracts where 30 
percent or more of the applicants are minorities as a percent of all approved 
lorn.. 
Lmders operati-  in laultiple tSA8  are treated as separate institutions.  This includes only 
those lenders with at least one minority  epplicant and et least one loan acceptance. 
Expressed as l devietion around ).M  means. 
Minim  and maxi-  contributions to variance besed on deviations around ).M  means. 
Source:  Authors 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 4:  Allocation of  Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Number of Minority 
Originations Relative to Nominority Originations. 1990 HMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
o  f  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  nu square'  X Minority  Relative 
~enderal  ~atio~  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
500 Applications 
100-500 Applications 




Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent 
1-5 Percent 
Less than 1 Percent 
Size of MSA 
>  25.000 Applications 
c 25.000 Applications 
99-QQ 
QQ-QQ 
Percent Minority Applications 
More than 22  Percent 
Less than 22  Percent 
Total  - 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved  loans to minority applicants relative to approved loans 
to nominority applicants. 
Lenders operatin8 in  multiple PMs  are treated as seperete institutions.  This includes only 
those lenders with at least one  minority applicant and at  leest one loan acceptance. 
Expressed as a deviation around ).M  means. 
Minimum  and maxi-  contributions to variMC0  based on  deviations around PM  means. 
Source:  Authors 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 5:  Allocation of  Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Number of  Central 
City Minority Originations, 1990  BMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  ~-~tquare~  X  Minority  Relative 
~endersl  ~atio~  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
500  Applications  189  .12  .99  77-99  1-23 
100-500  Applications  1,859  .ll  .97  96-98  2-4 
c 100  Applications  6,500  .24  .93  81-87  13-19 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5  Percent  1,785  .09  .95  94-97  3-6 
1-5  Percent  2.820  .13  .92  86-91  9-14 
Less than 1 Percent  3,943  .28  .94  78-85  15-22 
Size of USA 
>  25.000  Applications  1,570  .26  .95  82-89  11-18 
c 25.000  Applications  6.970  -21  .92  82-88  12-18 
Percent Minority Avvlications 
More than 22  Percent  1.205  .25  .94  75-85  15-25 
Less than 22  Percent  7,303  .22  .93  83-89  11-17 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved loans to minority applicants in central city census tracts 
as a percent of all approved loans to central city census tracts. 
Lenders opmrating in multiplm =As  arm  treated as separate institutions.  This includes only those 
lenders with at lmast one minority applicant and at least onm  loan acceptance. 
Exprmssmd as a dmviation around tSA mmans. 
Minimum and maximum contributions to variancm based on deviations around =A  means. 
Sourcm:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 6:  Allocation of  Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Number of Low- 
Income Originations, 1990 HMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable  to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  R-Square2  Z Minority  Relative 
~endersl  Ratio2  Applications  Approval Rate 
Tme  of Institution 





Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
>  500 Applications 
100-500 Applications 
c 100 Applications 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent 
1-5 Percent 
Less than 1 Percent 
Size of MSA 
25.000 Applications 
c 25,000 Applications 
Percent Minority ADDlicationS 
More than 22  Percent 
Less than 22  Percent 
Total  - 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved  loans to applicants with income not &reator than S25,000 
as a percent of all approved  loans. 
Lenders operating in  multiple HSAs are treated as separate institutions.  This includes only 
those lenders with at least one minority applicant and at least one loan acceptance. 
Expre88.d  as a deviation around ESA  means. 
Minimum and maximum contributiona to variance based on devistions around IM  moans. 
Source:  Authors 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 7:  Allocation of  Variance in Origination Ratios acroas Lenders:  Dollar Value of 
Low-Income Originations, 1990 BMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  It-square2  2  Minority  Relative 
~endersl  Ftatio2  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of  Institution 
500 Applications 
100-500 Applications 
<  100 Applications 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent  1,898  .16  .96  96-97  3- 4 
1-5 Percent  7,591  .29  .91  82-85  15-18 
Less than 1 Percent  4,162  .17  .93  92-94  6- 8 
Size of MSA 
> 25.000 Applications  2.236  .22  .91  89-91  9-11 
< 25.000 Applications  11,415  .26  .92  85-87  13-15 
Percent Minority A~plications 
More thm  22  Percent  1,238 
Less than 22  Percent  12,413 
Dependent Variable:  Dollar value of approved loan.  to applicmts with incow  not areator thm 
$25,000 as a percent of a11 approved loans. 
Lender.  operating in multiple MSAs are treated ar separate institutions.  This includes only 
those lenders with at least one minority +pplicant and at least one loan acceptmce. 
Expres.ed  as a deviation around MSA moms. 
Minimum md  maximum contribution.  to variance bared on dovietion.  around lSA means. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 8:  Allocation of Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Number of 
Low-Income Tract Originations.  1990 BMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination   square^  X Minority  Relative 
Lenders1  ~atiol  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
z 500 Applications 
100-500 Applications 
c 100 Applications 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent 
1-5 Percent 
Less than 1 Percent 
Size of MSA 
>  25,000 Applications 
c 25,000 Applications 
Percent Minority Auplications 
More than 22 Percent 
Less than 22 Percent 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved loans for properties  in census tracts where 30 parcant or 
more of the applicants have income not greater than S25.000  as a percent of 
all approved loans. 
Lenders operating in multiple MSAs are treated as separate institutions.  This includes only 
those lenders with at least one minority applicant and at least one loan acceptance. 
Expressed as a deviation around MSA means.  ' 
Minimum and maximum contributions to variance based on deviations around MSA means. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 0:  Allocation of Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Dollar Value of 
Low-Income Tract Originations, 1090 BMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination   quare^ re^  X Minority  Relative 
~endersl  ~atio~  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
>  500 Applications 
100-500 Applications 
<  100 Applications 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent 
1-5 Percent 
Less than 1 Percent 
Size of MA 
r 25,000  Applications  1.273 
4  25.000 Applications  9,751 
Percent Minority Aoolications 
More than 22 Percent  1.014  .24  .93  86-91  9-14 
Less than 22 Percent  10.010  .23  .04  91-93  7-0 
Total  - 
Dependent Variable: Dollar value of approved loans for propertims in cmnsus tracts where 30 
percent or more of the applicants have income not greater than $25,000 a.  s 
percent of all approved loans. 
Lenders operating in multiple ISAs are treated as separatm inatitutions.  This includms only 
those lenders with at least one minority applicant and at least onm loan acceptancm. 
Expressed as a deviation around MA  means. 
Minimum and maximum contribution.  to variance based on deviations around ?SA mmans. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 10:  Allocation of  Variance in Origination Ratios across Lenders:  Number of Lo*- 
Income Originations Relative to Non-Low-Income Originations, 1000 BMDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attributable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination   quare' re'  Z Minority  Relative 
~endersl  Flatio2  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
>  500 Applications 
100-500 Applications 
c 100 Applications 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent 
1-5 Percent 
Less than 1 Percent 
Size of  HSA 
>  25,000 Applications 
c 25,000 Applications 
Percent Minoritv Auulications 
More than 22  Percent 
Less than 22 Percent 
Total  - 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved loans to low-income  applicants relative to approved loans 
for non-low-income applicants. 
Lenders operating in multiple MSAs are treated as separate institutions.  This includes only 
those lenders with at least one minority applicant and at least one loan acceptance. 
Expressed as a doviation around MSA means. 
Minimum and maxi-  contributions to  variance based on deviations around MSA means. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 11:  Allocation of  Variance in Origination Ratio8 across Lenders:  Number of Central 
City Low-Income Originations, 1990 BHDA 
Std. Dev.  Percent Attr.ibutable to 
of  Variance in3 
Number of  Origination  R-square2  2  Minority  Relative 
~endersl  Ratio2  Applications  Approval Rate 






Other Mortgage Banks 
Size of Institution 
> 500 Applications 
100-500 Applications 
<  100 Applications 
Market Share of Institution 
More than 5 Percent 
1-5 Percent 
Less than 1 Percent 
Size of MSA 
> 25.000 Applications 
<  25.000 Applications 
Percent Minority ADDli~ati0nS 
More than 22  Percent 
Less than 22 Percent 
Dependent Variable:  Number of approved loans to low-income applicants in central city census 
tracts as a percent of all approved loans to central city census tracts. 
Lenders operating in multiple MSAs are treated as separate institutions.  This includes only 
those lenders with at least one minority applicant and st least one loan acceptance. 
Expressed as a deviation around USA means. 
Minimum and maximum contributions to variance based on deviations around WA  means. 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix  Table  12:  Linear Probability Model  of Minority  (1) or Nonminority  (0) 
Parameter Estimate  Standud Error 
Income  (S1.000's~ 
Incomo 
Income  Splino at  S20k 
Incano  Splino at  S4Ok 
Incano Splino at S60k 
Incomo Splino at  S8Ok 
Incomo Splino at  SlOOk 
Income  Splino at S150k 
Incomo Spline at  SZOOk 
Loan  Amount  ($1.000'a1 
Loan  hunt 
Loan  hunt  Spline at  S20k 
Loan  huat  Splino at S4Ok 
Loan  hunt  Splino at S60k 
Loan  huat  Splino ot S8Ok 
Loan  hunt  Splino at S100k 
Loan  hunt  Splino at S125k 
Loan hunt  Spline at  S200k 
Loan-to-Incotno  Ratio (Dumnios.  Lore  than  1.5 Is Base  Group1 
Ratio of  1.5 to 2.0  -.00301  ***  .00080 
Ratio of  2.0  to 2.225  -.00244  .00110 
Ratio of 2.225 to 2.5  .00093  .00138 
Ratio of  2.5  to 2.75  .00068  .00158 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  .00455  .00102 
Ratio ovor  3.0  .00365  .00175 
Emlieant Gondor  (I)umaios.  Famalo  Applicant.  No  Co-avplieant  Is Base  Group1 
Ha10  Applicmt,  F.molo Co-applicant  -.02765  ***  .00644 
Foamlo  Applicant.  Malo  Co-opplicmt  -.01765  **  .00652 
Halo Applicant and  Co-applicant  -.01237  .00664 
Falo  Applicant  and  Co-applicant  .00225  .00675 
Halo Applicant,  no  Co-applicant  -.01565  ***  .00002 
Jncomo.  lntoractod with  no Co-avulicant 
Income  -.00157  *** 
Incaw Spline at S20k  .00184 *** 
Incomo  Spline ot S40k  - .00028 
Incam Splino at S60k  .00036 
Incano Splino ot SIOk  .00012 
Incomo  Spline ot SlOOk  -.00047  ** 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 12  (Continued) 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
FHA Loan (Dummy) 
VA Loan (Dummy) 
Marital Status. Interacted with VA  or FFlA  Loan 
No Co-applicant  (VA Loan)  .02287 *** 
No Co-applicant (FHA Loan)  .00166 
Income. Interacted with VA or FHA  Loan 
Income  -.00141  ** 
Income Spline at S20k  .00096 
Income Spline at S4Ok  .00024 
Income Spline at S60k  -.00001 
Income Spline at S80k  -  .00007 
Income Spline at SlOOk  .00035 
Loan Amount. Interacted with VA  or FHA  Loan 
Loan hunt  -.00171  *** 
Loan hunt  Spline at SZOk  .00151 ** 
Loan hunt  Spline at S40k  -.  00025 
Loan Amount Spline at S60k  .00030 
Loan Amount Spline at S80k  .00004 
Loan Amount Spline at S100k  .00048 
Loan-to-Income  Ratio. Interacted with VA or FHA  Loan 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0  -.00542  ** 
Ratio of 2.0  to 2.25  -.00601 
Ratio of 2.25 to 2.5  -.01143  *** 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75  -.01058  ** 
Ratio of 2.75  to 3.0  -.00848 
Ratio over 3.0  - .00967 
Significant at the 5 Percent Level  .  Significant at the 1 Percent Level  .**  Significant at the .1 Percent Level 
Number of Observations  1.984.688 
Mean Uinority Share of Regression Sample  .I33 
Number of TractlInstitution Dumnies  607.631 
R-Squared (Including TractlInstitution Dunmiss)  .577 
R-Squared (Variation around TractlInstitution Means)  .005 
Source:  Authors 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 13:  Linear Probability Model of Loan Denial (1) or Acceptance (0) 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Race (Dumoies. "Other Race" Is Base Grouu) 
Black Applicant  .07271 *** 
Bispanic Applicant  .01031 ** 
Native American Applicant  -  .00174 
Asian Applicant  -.02186 *** 
White Applicant  -.02987 *** 
Mixed Race, Minority Co-applicant  (Durrmy)  .02410 ***  .00337 
Mixed Race, Nominority Co-applicant  (Dummy)  -.02690 ***  ,00329 
Income ($1.000'~) 
Income 
Income Spline at S20k 
Income Spline at S40k 
Income Spline at S60k 
Income Spline at S80k 
Income Spline at S100k 
Income Spline at S15Ok 
Incrme Spline at S200k 
Loan Amount (S1.000'~~ 
Loan Amount 
Loan Amount Spline at S20k 
Loan Amount Spline at S40k 
Loan Amount Spline at S60k 
Loan Amount Spline at S80k 
Loan Amount Spline at S100k 
Loan Amount Spline at Sl25k 
Loan Amount Spline at S200k 
Loan-to-Income Ratio  (Dmies.  Less than 1.5 Is Base GrouuL 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0  -.01016 ***  .00105 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.225  -.01168 ***  .00141 
Ratio of 2.225 to 2.5  -.01185 ***  .00163 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75  -.00737 ***  .00187 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  .00323  .00227 
Ratio over 3.0  .05062 ***  .00207 
Auplicant Gender (Dumnfes. Female A~~llcant.  No to-a~ulfcant  Is Base Group1 
Male Applicant. Famale Co-applicant  -.01886  .00763 
Female Applicant. bla  Co-applicant  -.  00766  .00772 
Hale Applicant and Co-applicant  - .00390  .00787 
Female Applicant and Co-epplicant  - .01021  .00800 
Hale Applicant, no Co-applicant  .02834 ***  .  00109 
Incune. Interacted With No Co-applicant 
Income  -.OO334 *** 
Incoma Spline at  S20k  .00516 *** 
Income Spline et  S4Ok  - .00051 
Incanm Spline at S60k  -.00137 *.* 
Incane Splina at  S8Ok  ,00018 
Incoma Spline at S100k  -.00045 
Race and flarftal Status. Interacted with VA  Loan 
Black Applicant  - ,00667 
Hispanic Applicant  - .00866 
Nativa American Applicant  ,04929 
Asian Applicant  .01699 
Whita Applicant  - .02033 
Other Race Applicant  .02562 
Sin6la Applicant  -.00619 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix Table 13  (Continued) 
Paramotor Entimate  Standard Error 
Race and Marital Staturn.  Interacted with FHA Loan 
Black Applicant  -.  01967 
Binpanic Applicant  -.  04312 ** 
Native Amorican Applicant  .00429 
Asian Applicant  -  .03294 
White Applicant  -  .03329 
Other Race Applicant  - .02377 
No Co-Applicant  -.01230  *** 
Income. Interacted with VA or ERA Loan 
Income  -.00169  ** 
Income Spline at S20k  .00295 *** 
Income Spline at S40k  -  .00032 
Income Spline at S60k  -  .00129 *** 
Income Spline at S80k  .00195 *** 
Income Spline at SlOOk  -.00157  *** 
Loan hunt.  Interacted with VA or ERA Loan 
Loan hunt  .00366 *** 
Loan hunt  Spline at S20k  -.00256 *** 
Loan hunt  Spline at S40k  -.00231 *** 
Loan hunt  Spline at S60k  .00066 
Loan hunt  Spline at S80k  -.  00038 
Loan hunt  Spline at SlOOk  .00052 
Loan-to-Income Ratio. Interacted with VA or ERA Loan 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0  -  .00333 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.25  -.00511 
Ratio of 2.25 to 2.5  -  .00612 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75  .00029 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  -.  00449 
Ratio Ovor 3.0  -  .00681 
Significant at tho 5 Porcont Lovol 
t  t Significant at the 1 Percent Lev01 
ttt  Significant at tho .1 Porcont Lwol 
Numbor of Observations  1,984,688 
Moan Denial Rat.  in Rogroaaion S.mplo  .I48 
Numbor of TractlInstitution hies  607,631 
R-Squared  (Including TractlInatitution hies)  .4  56 
R-Squared  (Variation around TractlInstitution Moms)  .022 
Source:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm